[Cryptech Tech] Introduction

[Fredrik Thulin]

On måndag 20 februari 2017 kl. 13:37:49 CET Jason van Aardt wrote:
> Hi Fredrik,
> 
> Nice to meet you virtually, May I ask if there is perhaps a list of the
> planned update/additions  for the next release of hardware?

This is what we've got: https://trac.cryptech.is/wiki/PostAlphaPlan

> What is the current performance if I may ask?
> Is the FTDI connected USB2.0 UART interface the primary interface
> currently? What is the throughput on the Serial side at the moment?

The performance I was thinking of was more along the lines of signing 
performance... The UARTs run at 921600 bps and unfortunately that is not our 
current speed bottleneck ;).

We're planning to replace the FTDI chips with an alternative design by Peter 
Stuge, using small STM32s to do higher speed USB in the short term. For the 
long term, the extremely loose plan is to maybe connect a GigE interface to 
the FPGA. We did route the 16 pin GPIO header with that in mind.

> I can see that Tamper detection is a big topic to cover based on the
> current hardware.
> 
> I see from the circuit diagram that the hardware tamper detection would be
> related to both additional hardware(Tamperswitch on lid? possible tamper
> Foil continuity circuitry?) as well as related code on the ATtiny, to wipe
> the Master Keys stored on the 23K640-I/SN?

Right

> As well as the Keystore memory, 128 Mbit (N25Q128A13ESE*) ?

No, everything in there is encrypted by the Master Key. I don't think there 
could ever be time and power available to securely wipe the keystore memory in 
case of a tamper event?

> Need to look at "Zerorise" function in case of rapid erase via panic button
> SW2, and a mechanical mechanism so that it is easy to zerorise, but not
> easy to do inadvertently.

We have the AVR code to wipe the Master key memory when the PANIC-button is 
pressed already. https://trac.cryptech.is/browser/sw/tamper

The PANIC button is just a proof-of-concept, but could also be seen as a 
"Zeroize" function as it stands today.

> Are there currently counter measures implemented against side channel
> attacks eg. differential power analysis?
> Using variable clock rates, additional nondeterministic loops etc.

Nope, nothing. Suggestions welcome.

> May I ask what is the best way to get a latest hardware release board?
> Though the ordering at https://www.crowdsupply.com/cryptech/open-hardware-> security-module?

Yes, that would be the best way.

/Fredrik