[Cryptech Tech] Happier RSA timing numbers
Paul Selkirk
paul at psgd.org
Thu May 24 15:41:23 UTC 2018
If you're referring to [6], it just means that both keywrap and
keyunwrap call do_block, not that we're wrapping and unwrapping in the
same operation.
paul
On 05/24/2018 11:14 AM, Russ Housley wrote:
> Rob:
>
> Am I reading this correctly? I am seeing both wrap and unwrap. I expected to see an unwrap, private key operation, overwrite the memory where the key was stored. This would save a whole bunch of AES operations.
>
> Russ
>
>
>> On May 23, 2018, at 1:14 AM, Rob Austein <sra at hactrn.net> wrote:
>>
>> Summary: 10.3 sig/sec throughput for 2048-bit RSA with eight Modexp
>> cores and four AES cores (Joachim's most recent version).
>> AES keyunwrap still dominates, but less of it is thumb
>> twiddling waiting for the AES core.
>>
>> There are some relatively minor improvements we might be able to make
>> to the FMC I/O code (remove some vestigial stuff which dates back to
>> the bridge board and preemptive tasking, move byteswapping to the FPGA
>> where we can do it with wires), but none of it's likely to be radical.
>> Might be worth doing anyway, since the ARM is underpowered and some of
>> the vestigial stuff chews up ARM CPU time to no useful purpose.
>>
>> The following call graph excerpt was from a test version of the
>> firmware with the "vestigial stuff" removed from the FMC code (seems
>> to work, at least, it passed all unit tests as well as a signature run
>> with eight clients and validation enabled):
>>
>> index % time self children called name
>> -----------------------------------------------
>> 0.00 51.25 3000/3000 hal_rpc_pkey_sign [4]
>> [5] 88.2 0.00 51.25 3000 pkey_local_sign [5]
>> 0.00 46.04 3000/3000 hal_ks_fetch [7]
>> 0.00 5.21 3000/3000 pkey_local_sign_rsa [19]
>> 0.00 0.00 6000/6806031 memset [44]
>> 0.00 0.00 3000/33907 hal_critical_section_start [122]
>> 0.00 0.00 3000/33907 hal_critical_section_end [192]
>> -----------------------------------------------
>> 0.00 0.28 37122/6000552 hal_aes_keywrap [57]
>> 0.33 45.48 5963430/6000552 hal_aes_keyunwrap [8]
>> [6] 79.3 0.33 45.76 6000552 do_block [6]
>> 0.76 17.30 6000552/6003854 hal_io_wait [12]
>> 1.96 12.44 18001656/19712064 hal_io_write [14]
>> 1.05 12.25 12001104/21468882 hal_io_read [10]
>> -----------------------------------------------
>> 0.00 46.04 3000/3000 pkey_local_sign [5]
>> [7] 79.2 0.00 46.04 3000 hal_ks_fetch [7]
>> 0.00 45.82 3000/3000 hal_aes_keyunwrap [8]
>> 0.00 0.20 3000/3072 hal_ks_lock [65]
>> 0.00 0.02 3000/3024 hal_mkm_get_kek [85]
>> 0.00 0.00 3000/6036 hal_ks_index_find [126]
>> 0.00 0.00 3000/369530 memcpy [83]
>> 0.00 0.00 3000/3024 ks_volatile_test_owner [205]
>> 0.00 0.00 3000/6036 hal_ks_block_read_cached [198]
>> 0.00 0.00 3000/6084 hal_ks_cache_mark_used [195]
>> 0.00 0.00 3000/3072 hal_ks_unlock [202]
>> -----------------------------------------------
>> 0.00 45.82 3000/3000 hal_ks_fetch [7]
>> [8] 78.9 0.00 45.82 3000 hal_aes_keyunwrap [8]
>> 0.33 45.48 5963430/6000552 do_block [6]
>> 0.00 0.01 3000/3024 load_kek [98]
>> 0.00 0.00 3000/9042 hal_core_free [90]
>> 0.00 0.00 3000/3042 hal_core_alloc [110]
>> 0.00 0.00 3000/6073 memmove [156]
>> -----------------------------------------------
>> 3.12 5.02 31734336/98674308 fmc_write_32 [16]
>> 6.59 10.59 66939972/98674308 fmc_read_32 [11]
>> [9] 43.6 9.71 15.61 98674308 _fmc_nwait_idle [9]
>> 15.61 0.00 98674308/98674308 HAL_GPIO_ReadPin [15]
>> -----------------------------------------------
>>
>> Be warned that this call graph is not strictly comparable to the
>> previous ones: the profiling script had been testing not just multiple
>> key sizes but also multiple numbers of clients, I dropped the latter
>> in favor of always trying just what should be the optimal number of
>> clients (now that theory and reality seem to match there --
>> deliberately running too many clients is useful as a torture test, but
>> may not give a very accurate picture of where the time is going for
>> the case we really care about).
>>
>> Full profiling report available if folks want to look at it. Be
>> warned that we're already past the point where enabling profiling has
>> a significant effect on throughput (current penalty is roughly 2x).
>>
>> I'll send a copy of the proposed change to the FMC code to Paul and
>> Pavel for review before pushing it to master.
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