[Cryptech Tech] Tamper MCU and memory choice
Fredrik Thulin
fredrik at thulin.net
Tue Jul 19 09:58:50 UTC 2016
Hi all
I met with Richard Lamb in Berlin, and in an interesting discussion about the
tamper subsystem he raised a couple of questions I think are relevant for the
list.
1) How fast are we erasing the master key from the volatile memory after a
tamper event? Richard thought maybe the ATtiny would be too slow. The answer
is that we can do it in just under 4ms plus a (short) sleep wake-up time.
I tweaked the tamper code to use SPI at f/4 speed, and not erase the whole
memory but just the first 256 bits (key) + 32 bits status and timed it with my
logic analyzer. Picture attached.
This is with busy-waiting for the PANIC button signal.
2) Is it best to have a separate MKM memory like we do today, or to instead
put the MKM in the volatile memory of the tamper MCU?
What reasoning is there really to have a separate memory? A memory chip is
probably a little bit faster in reacting to read requests, but to me it seems
much more difficult to shuffle the key around in memory (to prevent
imprinting) if it is a separate memory.
3) Richard also suggests using the PCF2127AT real-time clock instead of our
current MCP79412. The point as I understood it was that the PFC2127AT should
stay reasonably in sync over 10 years.
/Fredrik
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