[Cryptech Tech] goals / use cases
Joachim Strömbergson
joachim at secworks.se
Wed Jan 28 14:30:53 UTC 2015
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Aloha!
Peter Gutmann wrote:
> No, but why would you need that? Both SHA-1 and AES are totally
> deterministic, even if the implementation came straight from the NSA,
> what could they do with it?
Side channel leakage - for example. How do you determine that their AES
engine does not also do key dependent operations besides performing the
algorithm specified FIPS-197? Yes, we are inside the tamper boundary so
we can potentially reduce the problem. But the key thing is that we
don't know what they do. We have no control and little trust.
The whole point of Cryptech (at least my understanding of it) is to gain
trust by as far as is possibly have control by moving away from
dependencies of application specific functionality that we don't have
the source to and can control. That is why we want to provide our own
custom hardware that we can compartmentalize as much as we want.
Using the cores in the cores in the CPU would thus be a step in the
other direction from what we do with the Novena.
If we suddenly decided that we trust black boxes in our CPU for random
generation as well as crypto operations, blobs for firmware and sw, we
could simply buy ourselves a security chip, add Cryptlib, write some
custom SW to tie it all together put it in a box and be done. I don't
think that is the plan we will follow.
- --
Med vänlig hälsning, Yours
Joachim Strömbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svängning.
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Joachim Strömbergson Secworks AB joachim at secworks.se
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