[Cryptech Tech] ARM trust zone

Joachim Strömbergson joachim at secworks.se
Sun Feb 22 20:28:39 UTC 2015


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Aloha!

Peter Gutmann wrote:
> The hack described in there compromised the (insecure) TrustZone,
> then attacked the supposedly-insecure rest of the system from inside
> the security perimeter.  It's one of those neat "the calls are coming
> from *inside the house*" type of attacks :-).

- From my experience talking to and working with TrustZone, TEE people
that is really part of the security model though. If you can get an
escape from the TA inside the TEE, most people seem in the field seems
to understand that any secrets inside the TEE are then free for taking.

Right now, most TEE implementations are using thin process separation
mechanism. The purpose is to protect against escapes and problems in the
REE, and trust that the other TAs inside the TEE are doing their job.

The ones that don't like this are the ones pushing for having a Secure
Element as the next protection level.


Side note:
I don't know how much you Peter yet have looked at the FIDO
authentication standards (esp UAF). One thing that really scares med
with that standard is the inclusion of an Extension DOM in every
important message.

An extension with a boolean that tells the receiver (the client i.e. the
mobile phone) what to do if one module/handler in the local stack don't
know how to handle the extension.

The DOM can be of arbitrary size and have any fields as long as it is a
DOM. If the FIDO client does not know how to handle this DOM and the
flag is set to false, it must then send it down the stack to lower
levels which then must try to parse the DOM too. And pretty soon you end
up with a DOM parser inside a TA in the TEE... (What could possibly go
wrong with forcing every layer to have their own parser, esp in
constrained environments.)

FIDO is really interesting in many ways. You could probably write a
chapter for Engineering Security on its security model, design,
mechanisms etc. ;-)

- -- 
Med vänlig hälsning, Yours

Joachim Strömbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svängning.
========================================================================
 Joachim Strömbergson          Secworks AB          joachim at secworks.se
========================================================================
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