[Cryptech Tech] User auditable hardware entropy source/random number generator

Joachim Strömbergson joachim at secworks.se
Fri Jul 11 16:17:37 UTC 2014


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Aloha!

Bernd Paysan wrote:
> Am Donnerstag, 10. Juli 2014, 22:44:43 schrieb Leif Johansson:
>>> I know that the NSA was good at pulling all sorts of strings, but
>>> the way they managed to sneak in all these ultra-low-noise Zener
>>> diodes is really impressive on the border of scary:-)
>> Yeah there is no use for _low_ noise zener diodes ;-) Next they'll
>> go after amplifiers ... the bastards !
> 
> Hm, for noise sources, you should use avalanche diodes, not zener
> diodes
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avalanche_diode
> 
> The noise from zener breakdown is smaller than the one from avalanche
>  breakdown (most ener diodes have a mix of both breakdowns, so they
> are still sufficiently noisy), therefore, as a noise source,
> avalanche diodes are preferred.

It seems that at least quite a few hobbyist (and some professional
solutions) use transistors connected as diodes instead of a real diode.
Any thoughts on that?

See for example:
http://holdenc.altervista.org/avalanche/
http://www.entropykey.co.uk/tech/
http://forums.hackaday.com/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4189
http://emergent.unpythonic.net/01257868826
http://www.robertnz.net/hwrng.htm
http://robseward.com/misc/RNG2/
http://code.google.com/p/avr-hardware-random-number-generation/

(I think Fredrik has an even more extensive list)


One thing Fredrik highlighted is the long term behaviour/stabilty of
this source. This example has some data on this behaviour and tries to
control the source.

http://code.google.com/p/avr-hardware-random-number-generation/wiki/AvalancheNoise

Another issue we have been discussing is how fast one really can sample
a PN avalanche noise source. One suggestion has been that anything above
a few hunderd Hz is not good.

Any ideas about this Bernd and Benedikt?

- -- 
Med vänlig hälsning, Yours

Joachim Strömbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svängning.
========================================================================
 Joachim Strömbergson          Secworks AB          joachim at secworks.se
========================================================================
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