[Cryptech-Commits] [user/sra/libhal] 06/17: Refactor key loading code.
git at cryptech.is
git at cryptech.is
Fri Jun 19 17:56:35 UTC 2015
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.
sra at hactrn.net pushed a commit to branch master
in repository user/sra/libhal.
commit 7a89eaa086fa534a6a0aac45fa2f5865ef7839ef
Author: Rob Austein <sra at hactrn.net>
Date: Tue Jun 16 19:17:24 2015 -0400
Refactor key loading code.
---
cryptech.h | 31 ++++++++----
rsa.c | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
tests/test-rsa.c | 42 +++++++++------
3 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cryptech.h b/cryptech.h
index 2f8abc9..48f2a75 100644
--- a/cryptech.h
+++ b/cryptech.h
@@ -442,9 +442,8 @@
DEFINE_HAL_ERROR(HAL_ERROR_KEYWRAP_BAD_MAGIC, "Bad magic number while unwrapping key") \
DEFINE_HAL_ERROR(HAL_ERROR_KEYWRAP_BAD_LENGTH, "Length out of range while unwrapping key") \
DEFINE_HAL_ERROR(HAL_ERROR_KEYWRAP_BAD_PADDING, "Non-zero padding detected unwrapping key") \
- DEFINE_HAL_ERROR(HAL_ERROR_CRT_FAILED, "CRT calculation failed") \
+ DEFINE_HAL_ERROR(HAL_ERROR_IMPOSSIBLE, "\"Impossible\" error") \
DEFINE_HAL_ERROR(HAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION_FAILURE, "Memory allocation failed") \
- DEFINE_HAL_ERROR(HAL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_TFM_FAILURE, "Unknown libtfm failure") \
DEFINE_HAL_ERROR(HAL_ERROR_RESULT_TOO_LONG, "Result too long for buffer") \
END_OF_HAL_ERROR_LIST
@@ -608,17 +607,29 @@ extern hal_error_t hal_modexp(const uint8_t * const msg, const size_t msg_len, /
extern void hal_rsa_set_debug(const int onoff);
-extern hal_error_t hal_rsa_crt(const uint8_t * const m, const size_t m_len,
- const uint8_t * const n, const size_t n_len,
- const uint8_t * const e, const size_t e_len,
- const uint8_t * const d, const size_t d_len,
- const uint8_t * const p, const size_t p_len,
- const uint8_t * const q, const size_t q_len,
- const uint8_t * const u, const size_t u_len,
- uint8_t * result, const size_t result_len);
+extern const size_t hal_rsa_key_t_size;
+
+typedef enum { RSA_PRIVATE, RSA_PUBLIC } hal_rsa_key_type_t;
+typedef struct { void *key; } hal_rsa_key_t;
+extern hal_error_t hal_rsa_key_load(const hal_rsa_key_type_t type,
+ hal_rsa_key_t *key,
+ void *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len,
+ const uint8_t * const n, const size_t n_len,
+ const uint8_t * const e, const size_t e_len,
+ const uint8_t * const d, const size_t d_len,
+ const uint8_t * const p, const size_t p_len,
+ const uint8_t * const q, const size_t q_len,
+ const uint8_t * const u, const size_t u_len,
+ const uint8_t * const dP, const size_t dP_len,
+ const uint8_t * const dQ, const size_t dQ_len);
+extern void hal_rsa_key_clear(hal_rsa_key_t key);
+
+extern hal_error_t hal_rsa_crt(hal_rsa_key_t key,
+ const uint8_t * const m, const size_t m_len,
+ uint8_t * result, const size_t result_len);
#endif /* _CRYPTECH_H_ */
diff --git a/rsa.c b/rsa.c
index 31c4f61..0d3ae69 100644
--- a/rsa.c
+++ b/rsa.c
@@ -96,10 +96,8 @@ void hal_rsa_set_debug(const int onoff)
* can make memory allocation the caller's problem (well, maybe).
*/
-typedef enum { RSA_PRIVATE, RSA_PUBLIC } rsa_key_type_t;
-
-typedef struct {
- rsa_key_type_t type; /* What kind of key this is */
+struct rsa_key {
+ hal_rsa_key_type_t type; /* What kind of key this is */
fp_int n; /* The modulus */
fp_int e; /* Public exponent */
fp_int d; /* Private exponent */
@@ -108,9 +106,9 @@ typedef struct {
fp_int u; /* 1/q mod p */
fp_int dP; /* d mod (p - 1) */
fp_int dQ; /* d mod (q - 1) */
-} rsa_key_t;
+};
-const size_t hal_rsa_key_t_size = sizeof(rsa_key_t);
+const size_t hal_rsa_key_t_size = sizeof(struct rsa_key);
/*
* In the long run we want a full RSA implementation, or enough of one
@@ -134,7 +132,7 @@ const size_t hal_rsa_key_t_size = sizeof(rsa_key_t);
case FP_OKAY: break; \
case FP_VAL: lose(HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS); \
case FP_MEM: lose(HAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION_FAILURE); \
- default: lose(HAL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_TFM_FAILURE); \
+ default: lose(HAL_ERROR_IMPOSSIBLE); \
} \
} while (0)
@@ -162,13 +160,10 @@ static hal_error_t unpack_fp(fp_int *bn, uint8_t *buffer, const size_t length)
}
/*
- * modexp_fp() is a function I haven't written yet which takes
- * fp_int values, unwraps them, feeds the numbers into hal_modexp(),
- * and wraps the result back up as a fp_int.
+ * Unwrap bignums into byte arrays, feeds them into hal_modexp(), and
+ * wrap result back up as a bignum.
*/
-/* modexp_fp(&tmp.msg, &key.dP, &key.p, &tmp.m1) */
-
static hal_error_t modexp_fp(fp_int *msg, fp_int *exp, fp_int *mod, fp_int *res)
{
hal_error_t err = HAL_OK;
@@ -201,81 +196,124 @@ static hal_error_t modexp_fp(fp_int *msg, fp_int *exp, fp_int *mod, fp_int *res)
return err;
}
+
/*
- * CRT with the components we have. PyCrypto doesn't give us dP or
- * dQ, probably because they're so easy to calculate that it's
- * (almost) not worth the bother.
+ * Clear a key. We might want to do something a bit more energetic
+ * than plain old memset() eventually.
*/
-hal_error_t hal_rsa_crt(const uint8_t * const m, const size_t m_len,
- const uint8_t * const n, const size_t n_len,
- const uint8_t * const e, const size_t e_len,
- const uint8_t * const d, const size_t d_len,
- const uint8_t * const p, const size_t p_len,
- const uint8_t * const q, const size_t q_len,
- const uint8_t * const u, const size_t u_len,
- uint8_t * result, const size_t result_len)
+void hal_rsa_key_clear(hal_rsa_key_t key)
{
- hal_error_t err = HAL_OK;
- rsa_key_t key;
- struct { fp_int t, msg, m1, m2; } tmp;
+ if (key.key != NULL)
+ memset(key.key, 0, sizeof(struct rsa_key));
+}
- key.type = RSA_PRIVATE;
+/*
+ * Load a key from raw components. This is a simplistic version: we
+ * don't attempt to generate missing private key components, we just
+ * reject the key if it doesn't have everything we expect.
+ *
+ * In theory, the only things we'd really need for the private key if
+ * we were being nicer about this would be e, p, and q, as we could
+ * calculate everything else from them.
+ */
+
+hal_error_t hal_rsa_key_load(const hal_rsa_key_type_t type,
+ hal_rsa_key_t *key_,
+ void *keybuf, const size_t keybuf_len,
+ const uint8_t * const n, const size_t n_len,
+ const uint8_t * const e, const size_t e_len,
+ const uint8_t * const d, const size_t d_len,
+ const uint8_t * const p, const size_t p_len,
+ const uint8_t * const q, const size_t q_len,
+ const uint8_t * const u, const size_t u_len,
+ const uint8_t * const dP, const size_t dP_len,
+ const uint8_t * const dQ, const size_t dQ_len)
+{
+ if (key_ == NULL || keybuf == NULL || keybuf_len < sizeof(struct rsa_key))
+ return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS;
+
+ memset(keybuf, 0, keybuf_len);
-#define _(x) do { fp_init(&key.x); fp_read_unsigned_bin(&key.x, (uint8_t *) x, x##_len); } while (0)
- _(n); _(e); _(d); _(p); _(q); _(u);
+ struct rsa_key *key = keybuf;
+
+ key->type = type;
+
+#define _(x) do { fp_init(&key->x); if (x == NULL) goto fail; fp_read_unsigned_bin(&key->x, (uint8_t *) x, x##_len); } while (0)
+ switch (type) {
+ case RSA_PRIVATE:
+ _(d); _(p); _(q); _(u); _(dP); _(dQ);
+ case RSA_PUBLIC:
+ _(n); _(e);
+ key_->key = key;
+ return HAL_OK;
+ }
#undef _
+ fail:
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
+ return HAL_ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RSA decyrption/signature using the Chinese Remainder Theorem
+ * (Garner's formula).
+ */
+
+hal_error_t hal_rsa_crt(hal_rsa_key_t key_,
+ const uint8_t * const m, const size_t m_len,
+ uint8_t * result, const size_t result_len)
+{
+ hal_error_t err = HAL_OK;
+ struct rsa_key *key = key_.key;
+ struct { fp_int t, msg, m1, m2; } tmp;
+
fp_init(&tmp.t);
fp_init(&tmp.msg);
fp_init(&tmp.m1);
fp_init(&tmp.m2);
- /* Calculate dP = d % (p-1) and dQ = d % (q-1) */
-
- fp_sub_d(&key.p, 1, &tmp.t);
- FP_CHECK(fp_mod(&key.d, &tmp.t, &key.dP));
-
- fp_sub_d(&key.q, 1, &tmp.t);
- FP_CHECK(fp_mod(&key.d, &tmp.t, &key.dQ));
-
- /* Read message to be signed/decrypted into a bignum */
-
fp_read_unsigned_bin(&tmp.msg, (uint8_t *) m, m_len);
- /* OK, try to perform the CRT */
-
- /* m1 = msg ** dP mod p, m2 = msg ** dQ mod q */
- if ((err = modexp_fp(&tmp.msg, &key.dP, &key.p, &tmp.m1)) != HAL_OK ||
- (err = modexp_fp(&tmp.msg, &key.dQ, &key.q, &tmp.m2)) != HAL_OK)
+ /*
+ * m1 = msg ** dP mod p
+ * m2 = msg ** dQ mod q
+ */
+ if ((err = modexp_fp(&tmp.msg, &key->dP, &key->p, &tmp.m1)) != HAL_OK ||
+ (err = modexp_fp(&tmp.msg, &key->dQ, &key->q, &tmp.m2)) != HAL_OK)
goto fail;
- /* t = m1 - m2 */
+ /*
+ * t = m1 - m2.
+ * Add zero (mod p) once or twice if necessary to get positive result.
+ */
fp_sub(&tmp.m1, &tmp.m2, &tmp.t);
-
- /* Add zero (mod p) if necessary to get positive result */
if (fp_cmp_d(&tmp.t, 0) == FP_LT)
- fp_add(&tmp.t, &key.p, &tmp.t);
+ fp_add(&tmp.t, &key->p, &tmp.t);
if (fp_cmp_d(&tmp.t, 0) == FP_LT)
- fp_add(&tmp.t, &key.p, &tmp.t);
+ fp_add(&tmp.t, &key->p, &tmp.t);
if (fp_cmp_d(&tmp.t, 0) == FP_LT)
- lose(HAL_ERROR_CRT_FAILED);
+ lose(HAL_ERROR_IMPOSSIBLE);
- /* t = (t * u mod p) * q + m2 */
- FP_CHECK(fp_mulmod(&tmp.t, &key.u, &key.p, &tmp.t));
- fp_mul(&tmp.t, &key.q, &tmp.t);
+ /*
+ * t = (t * u mod p) * q + m2
+ */
+ FP_CHECK(fp_mulmod(&tmp.t, &key->u, &key->p, &tmp.t));
+ fp_mul(&tmp.t, &key->q, &tmp.t);
fp_add(&tmp.t, &tmp.m2, &tmp.t);
- /* Have result, write it back to caller */
+ /*
+ * t now holds result, write it back to caller
+ */
if ((err = unpack_fp(&tmp.t, result, result_len)) != HAL_OK)
goto fail;
- /* Done, fall through into cleanup code */
+ /*
+ * Done, fall through into cleanup.
+ */
fail:
- memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
-
return err;
}
diff --git a/tests/test-rsa.c b/tests/test-rsa.c
index 6925261..b415955 100644
--- a/tests/test-rsa.c
+++ b/tests/test-rsa.c
@@ -83,28 +83,38 @@ static int test_modexp(const char * const kind,
static int test_crt(const char * const kind, const rsa_tc_t * const tc)
{
- uint8_t result[tc->n.len];
-
printf("%s test for %lu-bit RSA key\n", kind, (unsigned long) tc->size);
- if (hal_rsa_crt(tc->m.val, tc->m.len,
- tc->n.val, tc->n.len,
- tc->e.val, tc->e.len,
- tc->d.val, tc->d.len,
- tc->p.val, tc->p.len,
- tc->q.val, tc->q.len,
- tc->u.val, tc->u.len,
- result, sizeof(result)) != HAL_OK) {
- printf("RSA CRT failed\n");
+ uint8_t keybuf[hal_rsa_key_t_size];
+ hal_error_t err = HAL_OK;
+ hal_rsa_key_t key;
+
+ if ((err = hal_rsa_key_load(RSA_PRIVATE, &key, keybuf, sizeof(keybuf),
+ tc->n.val, tc->n.len,
+ tc->e.val, tc->e.len,
+ tc->d.val, tc->d.len,
+ tc->p.val, tc->p.len,
+ tc->q.val, tc->q.len,
+ tc->u.val, tc->u.len,
+ tc->dP.val, tc->dP.len,
+ tc->dQ.val, tc->dQ.len)) != HAL_OK) {
+ printf("RSA CRT key load failed: %s\n", hal_error_string(err));
return 0;
}
- if (memcmp(result, tc->s.val, tc->s.len)) {
- printf("MISMATCH\n");
- return 0;
- }
+ uint8_t result[tc->n.len];
- return 1;
+ if ((err = hal_rsa_crt(key, tc->m.val, tc->m.len, result, sizeof(result))) != HAL_OK)
+ printf("RSA CRT failed: %s\n", hal_error_string(err));
+
+ const int mismatch = (err == HAL_OK && memcmp(result, tc->s.val, tc->s.len) != 0);
+
+ if (mismatch)
+ printf("MISMATCH\n");
+
+ hal_rsa_key_clear(key);
+
+ return err == HAL_OK && !mismatch;
}
/*
More information about the Commits
mailing list